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Abstract
The parallels and differences between current forms of populism and early 20th-century fascism 
have been the focus for much discussion. This article examines the relevance today of Karl 
Mannheim’s analysis of fascism and of its relationship to democracy in the 1930s. He argued 
that the threat of fascism arose from the very nature of liberal democratic society, rather than 
being a product of external forces. He claimed that liberal democracy is transitional, rather than 
stable in character, and that the new emerging form of governance that was required to replace 
it shared a key component with fascism: a high level of social and economic planning. At the same 
time, he insisted that, as a pathological development, fascism served to illustrate the disastrous 
consequences that a failure to engage realistically with the process of societal development can 
have for upholding Western civilisational ideals. This article explores Mannheim’s arguments 
against the background of current thinking about populism and ‘post-democracy’.
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A common, and contentious, theme in the substantial current literature on populism con-
cerns its relationship to democracy. There is an interesting parallel here with discussions 
in the 1930s and 1940s about the origins of fascism. One aspect of this is captured in the 
title of Sinclair Lewis’s (1935) novel It Can’t Happen Here. Around the same time that 
Lewis was sounding a warning about the dangers of fascism in the United States, Karl 
Mannheim ([1936] 1940, 1943) was arguing against a similar complacency in the UK. 
He had been exiled there after fleeing Nazi Germany, and he became preoccupied with 
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warning the British that the origins of fascism lay in problems intrinsic to liberal demo-
cratic society – that it could happen to them. Furthermore, he argued that these problems 
needed to be tackled with some of the same techniques as those used by the fascists, 
recognising that this would involve limits being placed upon individual freedom and 
democratic participation. There are strong resonances with present-day concerns about 
populism and its implications for democracy, including in the UK, and Mannheim offers 
a highly distinctive perspective on the issue.
I will begin with an outline of current debates about populism, before going on to 
discuss Mannheim’s arguments about fascism in the 1930s. Finally, I consider what les-
sons might be drawn from his work.1
Populism today
There are a variety of conceptions of populism in the current literature, and the uncer-
tainties surrounding the meaning of the term have frequently been noted (McKibben, 
2020; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017; Müller, 2016b; Urbinati, 2019).2 Historically, the 
label seems first to have been employed (in Russia and in the United States, in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries) to refer to political positions that celebrate the virtues of 
some large category of people who are commonly looked down on by those belonging to 
the ruling elite or dominant class because their life orientation and circumstances are 
considered inferior. In the case of Russia, it was the peasantry that was valorised by 
populists; in the United States, it was commercial smallholding farmers (Berlin et al., 
1968: 137–145; Kaltwasser et al., 2019: ch. 1). More recently ‘populism’ has come to be 
used in a usually derogatory manner to refer to a political strategy that adopts an ideol-
ogy purportedly supporting ‘the silent majority’, the ‘genuine citizen’, or the ‘true 
patriot’, but which is primarily concerned with enabling its exponents to gain power. In 
other words, it is often seen as a strategy employed in what Pareto ([1901] 1991) referred 
to as ‘the circulation of elites’, although a few political leaders and movements have 
applied the label ‘populist’ to themselves, giving it positive connotation (Moffitt, 2020).
So, an influential current interpretation of ‘populism’ portrays it as a distortion of 
democracy in which a political agent – a particular leader, party, or party faction – attacks 
established elites in the name of a segment of the population whose interests are declared 
to have been sacrificed or neglected by those elites, a segment that is presented either as 
the majority or as the most authentic part of society (Mudde, 2004: 543; Müller, 2016a). 
Sometimes, another section of the population or some external agent, whether a country 
that is a traditional enemy or a diaspora individual or group, is scapegoated as well. This 
populist ideology may be framed in terms of a rhetorical conflict between localism and 
cosmopolitanism, with the universalist claims of the elite being dismissed by populists 
as disguising the particularistic interests of its members (Ingram, 2017). Also, there can 
be an appeal to tradition, religion, or common sense, as against the claims of science or 
other sources of specialised expertise (Babones, 2018). In response to this, critics point 
to the self-interested motives of populist leaders and parties, charging that their represen-
tational claims are spurious.
In these terms, populism is at least potentially at odds with liberal democratic institu-
tions, in that these may be seen, or presented by populists, as not working to serve the 
Hammersley 3
interests of the whole, or the ‘true’, citizenry; thus, populist parties and leaders in gov-
ernment frequently seek to circumvent, control, or abolish some of those institutions, 
such as parliaments or independent judiciaries. Examples can be found in the recent 
history not just of Poland or Turkey but also of the US and the UK. More broadly, popu-
list governments are often at odds with any notion of a balance of powers, insisting that 
these restrict their capacity to represent the people properly.3 Given this, some commen-
tators have argued that populism is a distortion of democracy analogous to fascism and 
National Socialism in the 1930s and 1940s (Finchelstein, 2017). Indeed, it is suggested 
that in some respects it is a throwback to premodern absolutism: that, despite populist 
leaders’ use of the rhetoric of democracy, populism leads to dictatorship and to reliance 
upon political theatre rather than the exercise of sovereignty by citizens.
By contrast, others have argued that populism is a development from within democ-
racy (Kaltwasser, 2014). As already noted, populists often claim to be thoroughly demo-
cratic, indeed more democratic than the elites they are challenging or which they replace. 
They may argue, for example, that elected representatives have become distant from 
their electors and are pursuing their own agendas, that parliaments in which voting is 
governed by party allegiances do not represent citizens, that current legal rules and pro-
cedures are more amenable to the rich and powerful than to ordinary people, and so on. 
In place of mediating bodies that are denounced as failing to represent ‘the people’, what 
is (at least purportedly) offered is a direct democratic relationship with a symbolic figure 
who embodies its will (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).
One version of the sociological argument that populism grows out of democracy draws 
on mass society theory (Giner, 1976). This theory typically relies on a contrast between 
community and society (as characterised in Tönnies’ ([1887] 1957) hugely influential book 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft). Often, a community is believed to have coherence and 
structure, thereby giving rise to an organic ‘general will’ embodied in the state, whereas a 
society consists of differentiated and conflicting groups, or even of atomised individuals, 
whose thoughts and actions are governed entirely by their own divergent interests, rather 
than by any notion of the collective good. From this point of view, democracy may be 
regarded as a symptom of a fall from grace – of the shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft 
characteristic of modernity; and populism as the inevitable consequence, whether viewed 
negatively or as offering a solution. Populists often appeal to the Gemeinschaft ideal in 
challenging existing democratic institutions, though what is involved is not usually the 
project of restoring the ancien régime but rather of instigating a new type of political sys-
tem that draws on conservative ideals while at the same time reshaping them, along with 
the means by which they are to be realised. In this respect, there is a direct parallel with 
fascism (Finchelstein, 2017) and other forms of ‘reactionary modernism’ (Herf, 1984).
While populism has frequently taken Rightist, often nationalist, forms, there are those 
on the Left who have argued not only that it is a symptom of the failure of representative 
institutions, indeed of liberal democratic society generally, but also that it constitutes a 
means by which democracy can be rejuvenated and society transformed to realise Leftist 
ideals. From this point of view, what the emergence of Right-Wing populism signifies is 
that true democracy has not yet been achieved, and that it must be extended to all aspects 
of social life, including the economy. The main obstacle to this is regarded as capitalism 
– liberal democracy must be replaced by socialist democracy. An influential version of 
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this argument is post-Marxist in character (Laclau, 2005a, 2005b; Mouffe, 2016, 2018). 
These authors take over the common perception of populist leaders as constructing ‘the 
people’s will’ that they claim to represent, but it is argued that this process of construc-
tion is essential to politics. This view arises from Laclau’s and Mouffe’s rejection of the 
claim of traditional Marxism to identify different classes with distinct, structurally 
defined interests. Instead, it is insisted that interests must always be constructed, and 
support mobilised to serve them, in a political field that is contingent rather than socially 
determined (See also Frank, 2010).
Finally, while some, whether on the Right or the Left, have regarded populism as a 
symptom of the failings of actually existing democracy, others have argued that pop-
ulism highlights a fundamental, but perhaps productive, conflict within democracy that 
can only be managed not overcome. The tension may be identified as between ideal and 
reality: there is an inevitable gap between the promise of democracy – that it enables 
self-rule – and the practicalities that are necessarily involved in reconciling the conflict-
ing preferences of diverse groups and individuals, and the delays and compromises asso-
ciated with this (Sartori, 1987: 7–8; Bobbio, 1987: 26-27). Taking a slightly different 
approach, Canovan (1999) distinguishes between redemptive and pragmatic aspects of 
democracy. The first portrays democracy as an ideal to be enthusiastically embraced 
because it constitutes ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’. The 
second treats it as a means of avoiding or minimising conflict, a useful governmental 
technique rather than an ideal. She suggests that both aspects are essential if democratic 
states are to function well: the redemptive element provides the positive motivation to 
participate in, and to support, democratic regimes; while the pragmatic emphasis on the 
contribution that democracy can make to peace and stability is essential to reconcile citi-
zens to the messy business of actual politics – here the rationale is a negative one, that 
the alternatives are worse.
In the 1930s and 1940s, commentators sometimes concluded that the rise of Italian 
fascism and German National Socialism revealed the failings of liberal democracy, 
showing that it needed to be reconstructed in significant respects. A key example of this 
line of argument is the later work of Karl Mannheim, particularly his book Man and 
Society in an Age of Reconstruction, which was published in 1940.4 He viewed fascism 
as both highlighting what was wrong with liberal democracy and as indicating the means 
by which its problems could be solved, and the threat from fascism met. However, his 
ideas were significantly different from those put forward today by advocates of ‘Left 
populism’.
Mannheim on fascism and democracy
Mannheim’s analysis of the rise of fascism draws primarily on his experience of Weimar 
Germany.5 While living in his native Hungary until shortly after the First World War, he 
had gained deep knowledge of German ideas and culture. His mother was German, and 
he studied there briefly. With the failure of the communist government in Hungary in 
1919, he moved to Germany to continue his education, subsequently being appointed as 
an instructor in sociology at Heidelberg, and then full professor at Frankfurt from 1929 
to 1933 before he was forced to flee, eventually settling in the UK. It was after this 
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second exile that most of his writings about fascism and its implications for social 
democracy were published.
Mannheim argues that National Socialism arose out of the anarchy that occurred in 
liberal democratic Weimar Germany, where the regime was put under enormous pressure 
as a result, first, of the post-war political and economic settlement and then by the world 
recession. However, he also points to the extension of suffrage, and of political participa-
tion more generally, that occurred in the 19th and early 20th centuries, this bringing new 
sections of the population into the electorate who previously had had little or no political 
involvement, and therefore little experience of the complexities of policymaking and the 
constraints on it.6 While Mannheim views the process of democratisation as an inherent 
trend in modern societies, and as desirable, he argues that the great demands made on the 
post-war German state by newly enfranchised groups resulted in an inevitable failure to 
satisfy expectations, this feeding the growth, on both the Left and the Right, of radical 
parties that rejected liberal democracy, eventually resulting in the National Socialists’ 
taking power.
So, Mannheim puts forward a structural analysis of this process, suggesting that, 
while there were significant local features relating to the particular circumstances of 
Germany, the demise of the Weimar Government arose from fundamental problems with 
liberal democracy generally.7 Rather than seeing the latter as a stable new form of society 
that had emerged out of medieval restrictions, in the manner of Hayek (1944; Hammersley, 
2021), Mannheim ([1936] 1940) argues that it is in fact a transitional phase in a long-
term move towards a form of society in which there is greater governmental planning. 
This planning is essential because of increased economic and social complexity, not least 
as a result of developing technologies and new forms of economic organisation, which 
can no longer be rendered orderly by the operation of markets and other forms of spon-
taneous social organisation. He uses the analogy of the need for traffic direction at cross-
roads once the amount of traffic has grown beyond a certain point (Mannheim, [1936] 
1940: 157).8
Mannheim also insists that, where democracy operates in large states, elites are neces-
sary – since there is no possibility of direct democracy, it must take a representative 
form, and a powerful executive is required to exercise the essential planning control. 
Problems arise if democratisation is too rapid so that elites become insufficiently homo-
geneous in their assumptions and orientation, both because of the increased diversity in 
the social origins of their members and because new constituencies have to be wooed for 
support. In line with his earlier argument in Ideology and Utopia, Mannheim ([1929] 
1936) argues that a balance is required between a conservative and a utopian orientation; 
so that, while adaptation to changing social structural conditions is necessary, attempts to 
institute utopian changes, whether of the Right or the Left, must be controlled. For him, 
fascism is one form of utopianism, offering a vision of a new society that cannot be real-
ised, so that what results is a new and dictatorial political elite which subsequently 
represses even the spontaneous forces that had brought it to power (Loader and Kettler, 
2002). He labels this as a process of ‘re-primitivization’ (Mannheim, [1930] 2001: 
Lecture 5).9 Here we can perhaps see a direct parallel with the character of some current 
populist governments (Finchelstein, 2017).
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Central to Mannheim’s account is a sophisticated conception of the irrational and the 
rational, and of the relationship between the two. While he regards fascism as a product 
of the irruption of irrational forces, disrupting the rational governmental control that the 
Weimar Government sought to exercise, he does not view irrationality in an entirely 
negative manner. The term refers to anything that comes from outside of what is cur-
rently under control, psychologically or socially. The consequences of irrational forces 
can be undesirable, but they may also be progressive; indeed, they are the major spur to 
necessary social change (Mannheim, [1936] 1940: 62–63). He writes that ‘[. . .] plan-
ning can only have a positive value if it is based on the creative tendencies in society; i.e. 
if it controls living forces without suppressing them’ (p14). What are involved at the 
individual level are spontaneous desires of one sort or another that motivate action, but 
which need to be brought under control if that action is to be effective, or is not to have 
an unacceptable level of cost. Indeed, sometimes what is required is redirection of such 
desires. Similarly, at the societal level, as a result of democratisation, new groups with 
new needs and desires are brought into political play, which will spur change. But these 
will not have been rationalised so as to take into account the constraints imposed by cur-
rent social conditions and future prospects – a failure of what Freud, who was a major 
influence on Mannheim’s thinking, referred to as the reality principle. So, Mannheim’s 
([1936] 1940: 63, 91) argument is that if the process of democratisation occurs too 
quickly, so that the new tendencies cannot be rationally controlled, they will have unde-
sirable consequences, causing major social disorder and/or bringing about regimes that 
pursue unrealisable utopias, communist or fascist. He refers to this as ‘negative 
democratization’.10
Equally important, Mannheim ([1936] 1940: 86–87, 352–353) sees pluralism, or 
excessive pluralism, as a dangerous problem, which is why greater governmental coor-
dination is required than is characteristic of liberal democracy. The problem arises from 
the very nature of modern society, for example that economic efficiency and productivity 
are maximised through the concentration of ownership and control of the means of pro-
duction in the hands of a relatively small number of very large companies. Given their 
economic power, it is necessary to ensure that their activities serve national goals. While 
the invisible hand may work effectively in the early stages of commercial society, over 
time plural centres of power come to be at odds with one another, creating deep-seated 
conflicts. Thus, Mannheim argues that there is a need for democratic control of economic 
and political power by an elected elite, who act on the basis of scientific knowledge in 
deciding how best to achieve collective goals and serve the common good. This amounts 
to a distinctive blend of ideas whose political complexion is hard to characterise, but one 
that is some distance from most of those that inform contemporary social scientific 
analysis.
It should be clear that Mannheim displays a strong commitment to the preservation of 
social order, similar to that of some early sociologists and to what has often been charac-
terised as mass society theory (Bramson, 1961; Yamada, 2018). There are echoes, for 
instance, of Comte, who believed that liberal forms of governance are not adequate in the 
context of newly industrialising and urbanising Western societies (Bourdeau, 2018). 
However, as with Comte, Mannheim’s position is clearly at odds with that of restoration-
ist mass society theorists like de Bonald and de Maistre, who wished to reinstate the 
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feudal or absolutist regime that had existed prior to the French Revolution. Furthermore, 
unlike Comte, Mannheim is committed to both freedom and democracy, but at the same 
time he stresses the important role that sociology must play in indicating what is feasible 
in current social conditions and what is not, and in identifying what will result in regres-
sive outcomes if uncontrolled. There are strong parallels here with Durkheim, even 
though the proposed remedies are different (Bellah, 1973; Challenger, 1994).
Mannheim ([1929] 1936) recognised that sociology necessarily relies upon ideologi-
cal assumptions. He argued that ‘total ideologies’, in other words comprehensive world-
views relying on discrepant assumptions, were characteristic of modernity and 
unavoidable. However, he also insisted that the point had been reached where we must 
recognise that it is not only our political opponents’ views that are ideological, in the 
sense of stemming from their distinctive social location and fundamental assumptions, 
but also our own. Indeed, he believed that it was precisely this that opened the way for 
the development of sociology, and specifically for the sociology of knowledge. This 
involved recognising that every total ideology carries some insights as well as errors, and 
can only be understood in its social context. This was the basis for his attempt to learn 
lessons from fascism despite his opposition to it.
Lessons for today?
While there are many differences between the situation in the 1930s, when Mannheim 
was writing Man and Society, and how the world is now, there are also parallels. There 
was a major world depression at that time, and in the early years of the 21st century there 
was the financial crisis of 2008 and the ‘Great Recession’ that followed. More recently, 
there have been the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the 1930s, there 
was criticism of liberal democracy and of unrestricted capitalism; there was much pres-
sure for government intervention to counter the economic crisis. Mannheim’s views 
about the need for social and economic planning matched a strong stream of opinion at 
the time (Hammersley, 2021). Similarly, in the past few decades there has been increas-
ing criticism of capitalism and calls for government action to counter its effects; notably, 
growing social inequalities and disastrous climate change. Furthermore, some have seen 
UK governmental decision-making during the pandemic, despite its deficiencies, as a 
model for what is required in dealing with these problems, much as Mannheim believed 
that the mode of governance in Britain during the Second World War indicated what 
would also be necessary in peacetime. Finally, as noted at the start of this article, paral-
lels have been drawn between the spread of fascism in the 1930s and of populism in 
present-day societies.
If we compare Mannheim’s attitude towards fascism with the views about contempo-
rary populism I outlined earlier, he belongs in the second main strand: he does not regard 
fascism simply as a distortion of democracy but rather as indicating severe problems 
internal to it. Furthermore, he insisted that something could be learned from fascism in 
remedying these, this indicating a pragmatic rather than a redemptive view of democracy 
(Canovan, 1999).11 However, his position stands in sharp contrast to influential political 
positions opposed to fascism and populism that continue to be influential today: in 
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particular, traditional economic liberalism and advocacy of increased democracy. It is 
worth exploring the relationships between Mannheim’s position and these alternatives.
His views are clearly at odds with traditional economic liberalism, which prescribes a 
minimal state restricted to protecting property and providing a legal framework for eco-
nomic transactions in competitive markets. This was the basis for Hayek’s (1944) cri-
tique of the whole notion of central economic planning (Hammersley, 2021). And, while 
government in the UK during the Second World War and in the following couple of 
decades had some similarities with what Mannheim proposed, since the 1970s neoliber-
alism has largely prevailed. At the same time, there are, of course, significant differences 
between modes of governance today in the West and what was prescribed by classical 
liberalism: many markets are dominated by large, transnational firms, and governments 
have become subject to their considerable political influence, as well as outsourcing the 
supply of public services to them (Crouch, 2011).
Mannheim’s model also contrasts with what we might call radical conceptions of 
democracy; especially those which prescribe the direct participation of ordinary citizens 
in policymaking. As we saw, while Mannheim welcomed democratisation as an essen-
tial part of the modernisation process, he believed that it could be destabilising if too 
rapid or if it was extended too far. The political ideal underlying his position was gov-
ernment by a meritocratically recruited and democratically elected elite. By contrast, 
perhaps the most common version of radical democracy portrays policy decisions as 
arising out of collective public deliberation (Landemore, 2017). Another version, put 
forward by Left populists, treats democratic action as the mobilisation of mass support 
in the name of equality, relying on strategies which evoke common experience and 
aspiration, rather than on the ‘rational’ discourse valued by deliberative democracy. 
From both these radical perspectives, what Mannheim proposed is a form of elitism that 
they would view as necessarily serving the interests of the ruling group, rather than 
empowering citizens.
In short, Mannheim’s position can be criticised as neither liberal nor democratic. 
Indeed, it has sometimes been suggested that his proposed planned society amounts to a 
form of totalitarianism: that the cure he offers is no different from the illness (Hayek, 
1944). However, it is important to recognise that, unlike fascism and Right-Wing forms 
of populism, the values by which Mannheim defined the common interest that govern-
ment must serve were ones that are widely regarded as progressive: general economic 
prosperity, equality, and freedom. While he insists that these must be reinterpreted to fit 
current social circumstances, he does not abandon them. Nor, as noted earlier, did his 
commitment to the preservation of social order signify a desire to return to the ancien 
regime. His ‘third way’ is, therefore, positioned between classical liberalism and radical 
democracy, on the one hand, and communism and fascism, on the other. In this respect, 
it is also distinct from the ideological underpinnings of many contemporary forms of 
populism, of the Right and the Left.
Whether Mannheim’s proposed mode of governance would be viable today remains 
to be seen, of course, but similar doubts apply to liberalism and radical democracy. While 
Hayek and others have denied that the domination of markets by a small number of large 
companies is at odds with the operation of free competition, this was not the view of the 
ordoliberals with whom he was associated in the 1940s (Cerny, 2016; Jackson, 2010). 
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They argued that there are inherent trends towards oligopoly within capitalism, and that 
strong government action is required to prevent this if the benefits of competition – pro-
moting efficiency and innovation, and reconciling multiple conflicting demands in a way 
that maximises utility – are to be preserved. Similarly, actually existing democracies are 
a long way from the model championed by radical democrats. They rely on representa-
tion rather than direct participation, and operate on a party basis. And government within 
them involves the exercise of executive power by an elite. Crouch (2020) argues that we 
have entered a phase of post-democracy that cannot be reversed, only coped with. 
Political parties and leaders have lost direct contact with their traditional constituencies, 
and politics has become a field in which leaders and parties market themselves through 
misleading publicity and strategic manipulation. Moreover, national governments no 
longer have the power to make many of the key decisions that affect the lives of their citi-
zens, as a result of globalisation. Deploring these developments is easy enough, but 
bringing about change that would realise either the liberal ideal of a commercial society 
or radical democracy is much more challenging, perhaps utopian. Mannheim would have 
insisted that the structural characteristics of modern societies render both of these ideals 
impossible to achieve, and attempts to produce them regressive in their consequences.
Mannheim’s position has two features that are especially worth highlighting in light 
of the current preoccupations of sociologists, for example as represented in what Smith 
(2014) calls their ‘sacred project’ of championing equality and diversity. One concerns 
the very character of values like freedom and democracy. Mannheim insists that the 
meanings of these terms are not universal and fixed: they are always shaped by particular 
contexts. It is tempting to dismiss fascist appeals to freedom, and communist claims to 
democracy, as mere rhetoric. To a degree, this accusation is true, though the same might 
also be said of Western governments’ appeals to those values. But underlying these vari-
ous rhetorical claims are differences in what kinds of freedom and democracy are held to 
be both desirable and feasible. Mannheim is surely right to argue that democratisation 
does not always have beneficial effects in terms of good government, and that not all 
forms of freedom serve the common good. While he does not spell out in concrete detail 
what modifications to our conceptions of freedom and democracy are required, his dis-
cussion makes clear that the meaning of these principles in practical terms cannot be 
taken for granted. For example, in relation to liberalism, Mannheim (1943: 156) acknowl-
edges the argument that the ‘limitless craving for more and more luxury goods’ is ‘the 
unnatural response to endless stimulation of desires originating in a competitive system’, 
where ‘producers try to outdo each other by creating cravings for new kinds of goods’. 
He suggests that ‘a movement could be fostered which is based upon the view that mod-
eration and restriction are essential for the human being’.12
The second feature of Mannheim’s work that I believe is instructive is his emphasis 
on the key role of science, and especially of sociology, in the process of policymaking.13 
He viewed this as filtering and reformulating popular demands made on the governing 
elite, turning them into rational policies. He also saw sociology as providing the frame-
work within which education needs to be restructured so that democratic demands are 
eventually rationalised at source, this simultaneously producing rational consent to the 
new mode of governance (Stewart, 1953; Wolff, 1971: ch. 11). He believed that many 
citizens who had been drawn into political participation did not have the knowledge, 
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experience, and capacity to make sound political judgements (Mannheim, [1936] 1940: 
45). He was not unusual in taking this view at the time: a similar, perhaps even more 
pessimistic, argument can be found in the writings of Lippmann (1922, 1927), Schumpeter 
(1942), and (a little later) in Lipset’s (1960) Political Man. Today, we find parallel argu-
ments among those who advocate ‘epistocracy’: the restriction of political participation 
to the highly educated (Brennan, 2016). But Mannheim would have viewed this proposal 
as reactionary. He wrote that ‘either one desires democracy, in which case one must 
attempt to bring everyone to more or less similar levels of understanding, or one must 
reverse the democratising process, which indeed the dictatorial parties are, of necessity, 
attempting to do’ (Mannheim, [1936] 1940: 46).
Of course, there is a striking discrepancy here between Mannheim’s conception of the 
nature and role of sociology and current views. Where he regards it as serving policy-
makers, and as introducing a necessary realism into the process of government by iden-
tifying the structural characteristics of present-day societies and their likely future 
development, many contemporary sociologists view their task as to show that present 
socio-political arrangements are neither natural nor inevitable, that change is possible. In 
short, they view their discipline as fundamentally oppositional or ‘critical’ in character 
(Smith, 2014; Turner, 1992). Furthermore, as I noted, he specifically rejected political 
perspectives that are utopian – in the sense of proposing alternatives that do not recog-
nise the constraints of the situation. Utopias must be rationalised if they are to have desir-
able political consequences. In this respect, his work prefigured claims about ‘the end of 
ideology’ in the 1950s (Dittberner, 1979).
Mannheim’s emphasis on the role of scientific evidence is similar in some respects to 
arguments for evidence-based policymaking that have been influential since the 1990s 
(Hammersley, 2013). However, where these have focused on the provision of specific 
pieces of evidence about the likely effectiveness of proposed or existing policies, he 
believed what was required was a more comprehensive perspective, drawing on multiple 
political perspectives and synthesising knowledge from a variety of disciplines 
(Mannheim, [1929] 1936). While he recognises that there can be no stepping outside of 
ideological assumptions, he insists that specific events and processes can only be prop-
erly understood in their wider contexts. Where Weiss (1983) argues that policymaking is 
necessarily based on ideology, interests, and information, with the last being filtered 
through the first two, Mannheim holds out the prospect of ideological assumptions being 
progressively rationalised so as to provide a comprehensive practical–theoretical under-
standing that can guide policymaking.
Mannheim identifies important issues that are frequently neglected. He is surely right 
that a working democracy necessarily involves the mediation of popular demands: it can-
not translate all of them directly into implemented policies. In this sense, he distinguishes 
democracy from good governance, rather than treating the two as identical. Furthermore, 
science, including social science, must play a key role in this process if problems are to 
be accurately diagnosed and effective means of implementing policies discovered. It is 
also true that we can learn from opposing political perspectives, rather than seeing these 
as fundamentally at odds: we must recognise that, while not easily reconcilable, they 
derive from differential emphasis on a set of values that is widely shared, as well as on 
discrepant assumptions about human nature and society. And these assumptions are 
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clearly open to investigation. Moreover, as even Weber recognised (Bruun, 2007), it is 
possible to engage in rational argument about value judgements regarding what is wrong, 
and what ought to be done, in particular cases – even though agreement is by no means 
guaranteed. Mannheim is perhaps also right to stress the need for any specific evidence 
about particular problems or policy options to be contextualised within a view of the 
larger society. This will be done implicitly anyway, so there is much to be gained from 
making what is assumed explicit.
At the same time, there are obvious weaknesses in Mannheim’s position. He almost 
certainly has excessive confidence in the public service orientation of governing elites 
and their advisers, underestimating the potential for corruption. Furthermore, he surely 
overestimates the capacity of social science to provide the sort of comprehensive per-
spective he believes is needed for sound policymaking. Floud (1966) quotes A. D. 
Lindsay, who became a friend of Mannheim in England, to the effect that:
‘Mannheim always resisted very strongly the suggestion that there was any limit to sociological 
knowledge, any suggestion that legislation, like moral action, was partly a leap in the dark. One 
always felt that he had a sociological faith that all these blanks of ignorance about society could 
be overcome’. (p. 970)
Furthermore, Mannheim seems to assume a continuity between science and wise govern-
mental decisions. Yet there is a significant gap: research cannot provide all of the knowl-
edge that these decisions require, nor can it validate the judgements that are necessary in 
balancing competing values (Hammersley, 2013). Hayek’s distinction between technical 
and practical decisions is relevant here, only the first being open to scientific solution: the 
heterogeneous desires of individuals, as well as inevitable limits to available information, 
rule out any possibility that what is in the common interest could be determined by techni-
cal means alone (Caldwell, 2003: 187). From a very different perspective, Laclau (2005a) 
emphasises the agonistic choices that must be made in politics. However, while it is true 
that Mannheim probably exaggerates the contribution that social science and rational 
deliberation can make to policymaking, these other authors tend to underestimate it.
Conclusion
This article has examined connections between current discussions of populism and Karl 
Mannheim’s views about the causes and significance of fascism in the 1930s. Diverse 
meanings have been given to the term ‘populism’, these implying different relationships 
between it and democracy. Some have claimed that fascism and populism are distortions 
of democracy. Others argue that both fascism and populism highlight failings in current 
democratic processes, indicating the need for radical change in the direction of broader 
and more participatory forms. Yet other commentators insist that populism arises from an 
essential tension within democracy that can only be managed, not eradicated. Mannheim 
does not use the term ‘populism’, but his discussions of fascism touch on many of the 
same issues. He treats fascism as a product of the anarchy that is always a potential threat 
during the process of democratisation in liberal societies. Moreover, he insists that, in 
some respects, fascism points to changes that are necessary if those societies are to be 
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stable and prosperous, in particular that a considerable degree of governmental social and 
economic planning is required. In this respect, his diagnosis and recommendations have 
similarities with those of some commentators on populism today, despite other differ-
ences (Kaltwasser, 2014). At the same time, Mannheim has a strong sense of the extent to 
which social structures, and changes within them, are beyond our control, of the dangers 
of social disorder, and of how our political ideals may need to be re-constituted.
It is not uncommon to find populism dismissed as a political evil, rather than examined 
for what can be learned from it about democracy.14 Given this, Mannheim’s stress on the 
unavoidability of elites and the problems associated with democratisation may be salutary 
(Mannheim, [1933] 1956), along with his insistence on the technical, not just political, 
character of the problems that face modern societies, and therefore on the value of scien-
tific expertise (Mannheim, [1936] 1940). Were he still alive, he would probably be point-
ing to the spread of populism as signalling that liberal democracies continue to be faced 
with deep-seated internal problems that destabilise them, as well as insisting that only a 
move towards a more planned society relying on scientific knowledge offers an escape.
Mannheim’s emphasis on the role of science and expertise is at odds with much politi-
cal thought today. Contrary not just to the views of most populists but also many liberals 
and radical democrats, he saw such knowledge as providing guidance that ought often to 
override the views of citizens and serve as a foundation in educating them for their role 
in society. This is, of course, in sharp contrast with many sociologists’ conceptions of the 
public role of their discipline as oppositional or ‘critical’, or as redeeming ‘subjugated 
knowledges’ (Burawoy, 2005; Smith, 2014). We may find his views unpalatable, but in 
line with his own commitment to engaging with perspectives to which he was fundamen-
tally opposed, not least fascism, we should give them attention. Doing so may help us to 
understand present crises better.
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Notes
 1. For excellent discussions of Mannheim’s work and the background to it, see Kettler et al. 
(1984, 2008) and Loader (1985).
 2. There have been various efforts at conceptual clarification, for example distinguishing it from 
nationalism (see Moffitt, 2020), but in this article I will rely on the loose set of overlapping 
senses in which the term is generally used.
 3. It is worth noting that one effect of this is that any criticism of a populist government or leader 
tends to be treated as criticism of the nation or the people, and therefore as treasonous.
 4. There had been a German edition of Man and Society, published in the Netherlands where 
Mannheim initially sought refuge from the Nazis. Various parts of the later English book 
were given as lectures or published as articles or book chapters in the 1930s. See Mannheim 
([1936] 1940: xxi)
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 5. Mannheim uses the term ‘fascism’ to cover not only the type of polity instituted by Mussolini 
and his followers in Italy, but also German National Socialism. For a useful overview of the 
Weimar political culture and Hitler’s rise to power, see McElligot (2009).
 6. There are strong similarities between Mannheim’s analysis and that of Carl Schmitt ([1923] 
1985) in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (see Bellamy and Baehr, 1993). In the 
case of Weimar Germany, universal suffrage, as usually defined, was achieved in 1919 with 
women gaining the vote. Furthermore, under the new constitution, the Reichstag had much 
more power than previously to make decisions. It is worth noting that Mannheim ([1936] 
1940: 43) also believed that the existing structure of society generated differential posses-
sion of the knowledge and skills required for political participation: ‘It is the social structure 
which in this sense favours certain groups and condemns others to passivity, since to one it 
assigns tasks which require certain acts of thinking and deciding, while the others can adjust 
themselves to their position only by renouncing all insight or initiative’.
 7. The complexities of any account of what happened in Weimar Germany are nicely illustrated 
by Ziemann’s (2010) account of diverse explanations.
 8. His argument was at odds here not just with the views of Hayek, whose Road to Serfdom was 
in part a response to it, but also with those of Michael Polanyi, with whom he was in contact 
when in England. See Polanyi’s (1952) review of one of Mannheim’s books.
 9. In his discussion of ‘Nazi group strategy’, Mannheim (1943: ch. VI) suggests that this 
involves the systematic breakdown of social ties, rather than a return to an earlier form of 
social life.
10. Brennan (2016), drawing on Schumpeter, takes the argument a step further, arguing ‘against 
democracy’, partly on the grounds that political participation is bad for people. Schumpeter 
(1942) had argued that ‘the typical citizen “becomes a primitive again” as soon as “he enters 
the political field”’ (quoted in Swedberg, 2003: xix).
11. Mannheim’s conception of democracy was closer to what Schumpeter (1942) refers to as 
‘Democracy as Competition for Political Leadership’, as a governmental mechanism, than to 
‘the Classical Doctrine of Democracy’ according to which democracy is of value in itself, as 
government by the people for the people. He nevertheless believed it was worth defending, 
echoing calls for ‘militant democracy’ (Mannheim, 1943).
12. However, Mannheim does not explicitly ground his views about freedom and democracy 
philosophically. Like many sociologists today, he seems to take his own value-commitments 
largely for granted. He had abandoned the sort of meta-narrative of human development 
provided by Hegel and Marx, but offered no explicit alternative – unlike some members of 
the Frankfurt School, notably Adorno. See also the more recent work of Honneth (Foster, 
2011). It seems likely that what underpinned Mannheim’s views was Freud’s assumption of 
an essential conflict between desire and reality, and of the necessary role of the superego (or 
the state) in mediating between them.
13. On the neglect of this topic, see Turner (2003).
14. For criticism of this, see Eatwell and Goodwin (2018).
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